Summary

Lay theories of expertise are beliefs about the meaning of expertise. Our research, published in the Journal of Management Studies, reveals that there are several differing beliefs about expertise in the population, and that they matter for who we recognise as experts.

What does it mean to be an expert?

“I am better off than he is, for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him.” – Socrates (in Plato’s Apology, c. 400BC)

“I know more about drones than anybody.” – Donald Trump (in a press conference, 2019)

The quotes above—each from very different eras—illustrate two different perspectives on the meaning of expertise. While the current President of the United States suggests that knowing more than others is the hallmark of expertise, the ancient philosopher Socrates highlights that recognising one’s limits is more important.

Today, these differences in people’s assumptions about the meaning of expertise can have serious consequences. For example, the underlying belief that experts should be immensely knowledgeable can breed an attitude that they should also be completely certain of their judgements. This attitude can make people gravitate toward over-confident (but under-qualified) individuals who promise foolproof solutions, and follow their simplistic or even harmful advice on pressing challenges regarding healthcare, climate change, and politics.

Yet despite such consequences, researchers have yet to systematically map laypeople’s assumptions about the meaning of expertise, or explore how differences in these assumptions might affect who people do (and don’t) recognise as experts.

What are lay theories of expertise?

Since 2019, we have been working to address this issue, with our efforts recently being published in the Journal of Management Studies. Looking back at the work of researchers like Jean Piaget, a “lay theory” is one of the oldest concepts in psychology, and refers to a person’s subjective—often intuitively developed—theory about what something is and how it works. From this starting point, we undertook several studies to map prominent “lay theories of expertise” that exist in the English-speaking population.

Our first study involved a survey where we asked people to freely describe their understanding of expertise. The second study was an analysis of Twitter (now X) posts about experts during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. And the final mapping study was a word sorting task, where we asked one sample of participants to generate words they most associated with expertise, and another group to sort these words into broader categories.

Some of the lay theories of expertise we identified through these studies were intuitive and widespread. For example, the most pervasive was what we call the “epistemic” lay theory – the assumption that exceptional knowledge is a defining feature of expertise. The “practical” lay theory (the assumption that expertise is defined by solving problems and getting results) was also a recurring theme in our data, as was the “developmental” lay theory, which emphasises specialist training and education as central to expertise. Emerging primarily from our social media data was the “constuctionist” lay theory, conveying the belief that expertise is a socially constructed status. This lay theory was particularly evident in the posts of disgruntled Twitter users who claimed that “so-called experts” on COVID-19 were those invited to talk shows or simply dubbed experts by other leaders, rather than possessing any real knowledge about the infectious disease.

Interestingly, and though far less common, we also collected evidence of the “Socratic” lay theory of expertise, suggesting that expertise is about recognising one’s limitations, as captured by the following tweet during the pandemic:

“Why are people angry at people being called experts when they say they are unsure about something? A tell-tale sign of an expert is that if they don’t know something they will say so. The difference between them and us is that they will know first. What they say now matters.”

Lay theories in action

Based on these mapping studies, a critical question emerged: does holding a particular lay theory of expertise have any impact on who people recognise as experts? To address this question, we designed two experiments wherein US-based managers were exposed to either a practical or Socratic lay theory intervention (or a control), which was intended to make most salient the respective lay theory.

In the first experiment, the managers read a vignette that put them in the workplace situation of collaborating with a legal specialist to deal with a complaint. The vignette deliberately portrayed the specialist as transparent about his limitations. After working through this vignette, managers rated the specialist on a variety of criteria measuring the extent to which they saw him as an expert. The results revealed two important observations: that a relatively short intervention was enough to meaningfully influence people’s lay theories (at least for the duration of the experiment), and that those induced with a Socratic lay theory did indeed recognise the humble legal specialist as more expert than other participants. This latter insight highlights that congruence between one’s lay theory and the attributes of a focal individual are integral for recognising that individual as an expert.

In the second experiment, this congruence effect was replicated, such that some people recognised a humble individual as more expert when their Socratic belief was most dominant, and others recognised a confident individual as more expert when their practical belief was most dominant. We also found that expert recognition was affected by the gender of the focal individual, particularly when she was a woman: no matter what lay theory was most dominant, participants recognised the woman (but not the man) as less expert when she exhibited behaviour that was incongruent with one’s lay theory of expertise.

Final thoughts

Our study of lay theories of expertise not only reveals that people differ in their beliefs about what constitutes expertise, but that these beliefs are consequential for who people recognise as experts. We also see that these lay theories interact with assumptions about gender, such that people are less likely to recognise women as experts when they behave in ways that are inconsistent with people’s beliefs about expertise. By further investigating these lay theories, we hope to cultivate better relationships between experts and those who seek them out as we strive to address important organisational and societal challenges.